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Significant releases of highly toxic and flammable materials have occurred in various industries 
as a direct result of corrosion effects and other damage mechanisms.  Examples of such events 
can readily be found in petroleum refineries and ammonia refrigeration facilities.  Understanding 
and identification of these damage mechanisms and locations of susceptibility play a critical role 
in limiting the likelihood of loss of primary containment, which can have serious safety 
consequences.   
 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) provides a thorough and efficient method for systemically 
reviewing complex systems for safety concerns.  A commonly applied PHA method is the 
Guide-Word Style Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) approach, which breaks complex systems 
into focused sections called nodes.  This methodology can be augmented to systematically 
address the effects of various damage mechanisms.  Possibility of corrosion and other damage 
mechanisms can be included in each node through the addition of a new deviation dedicated to 
these phenomena.  The PHA Team with the help of a subject matter expert reviews the various 
mechanisms unique to a particular node that can cause loss of integrity.  
 
PHA discussions of damage mechanisms should address normal and abnormal operating 
conditions.  The timing of progression of damage mechanism effects and established methods for 
discovering the damage (detection safeguard) should be explicitly noted.  It is important to note 
that such discussions require participation of experts in metallurgy, corrosion mechanisms, 
inspection techniques, and process chemistry.  The proposed method has been applied 
successfully in identifying potential vulnerabilities and improvements to minimize the risks 
associated with corrosion.  Specific examples are shown from actual studies addressing 
systematic analysis of damage mechanisms and the lessons learned from those studies. 
1. Introduction and Background 
Major events within the past several years have resulted from damage mechanisms that 
progressed to loss of containment incidents1.  Damage mechanisms can occur as both slow and 
fast acting types and appear in a multitude of forms.  As a result of several of these incidents, 
investigating agencies such as the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) have issued incident reports 
documenting that the Process Hazard Analysis must be used as a tool to identify and establish the 
risks associated with damage mechanisms.  For example, as part of the CSB’s investigation of 
the Tesoro Anacortes incident in 2010 [Reference 1], the board issued Recommendation 2010-
08-I-WA-4, which includes the following statement: 
“iii. Documented damage mechanism hazard review conducted by a diverse team of 
qualified personnel. This review shall be an integral part of the Process Hazard 
Analysis cycle and shall be conducted on all PSM-covered process piping circuits 
and process equipment. The damage mechanism hazard review shall identify 
potential process damage mechanisms and consequences of failure, and shall ensure 
effective safeguards are in place to control hazards presented by those damage 
mechanisms. Require the analysis and incorporation of applicable industry best 
practices and inherently safer design to the greatest extent feasible into this review; 
and . . .” 
Additionally, CSB’s investigation of the Chevron Richmond Refinery Incident in 2012 
[Reference 2], included the following recommendation:  
 
2012-03-CA-9 “Revise the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189, 
Process Safety Management of Acutely Hazardous Materials, to require improvements 
to mechanical integrity and process hazard analysis programs for all California oil 
refineries. These improvements shall include engaging a diverse team of qualified 
personnel to perform a documented damage mechanism hazard review. This review 
shall be an integral part of the Process Hazard Analysis cycle and shall be conducted 
on all PSM-covered process piping circuits and process equipment. The damage 
mechanism hazard review shall identify potential process damage mechanisms and 
consequences of failure, and shall ensure safeguards are in place to control hazards 
presented by those damage mechanisms. Require the analysis and incorporation of 
applicable industry best practices and inherently safety systems to the greatest extent 
feasible into this review.”  
 
As a result of the latter event and subsequent recommendations from the CSB, an Interagency 
Working Group was formed in California that put forward the following recommendations in 
their report [Reference 3] addressing oil refineries: 
  
                                                 
1 The CSB lists 125 significant petroleum refinery incidents in 2012 as part of Appendix A of its Regulatory Report on the Chevron Richmond 
Refinery incident [Reference 2].  Many of these events were associated with system integrity failures.  
Recommendation F.3.1.c 
“Require Refineries to Conduct Damage Mechanism Hazard Reviews 
Current PSM and CalARP programs require facilities to include a Mechanical 
Integrity Process Safety element. The Mechanical Integrity element requires facilities to 
ensure the mechanical integrity of processes through purchasing of new or replacement 
equipment, performing inspections, and other actions. But current regulation does not 
require that an important type of analysis, known as damage mechanism hazard 
review, be conducted at refineries. This review analyzes risks presented by all known 
process failure mechanisms at refineries, including corrosion, stress cracking, damage 
from high temperatures, and mechanical or metallurgical assisted degradation, and 
should be included as part of the Mechanical Integrity element. In addition, the results 
of the damage mechanism hazard reviews, as well as other Mechanical Integrity 
reviews currently required, should be explicitly incorporated in the information 
provided to process hazard analysis teams at refineries, and to agencies overseeing 
refinery safety.  Current regulation (both the Contra Costa County ISO and Title 8 
PSM regulations) requires that these results be used by process hazard analysis teams 
at refineries, and these teams should be required to include a corrosion engineer or 
other professional with the expertise to understand this information.” 
 
The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) and California’s 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (CalOSHA) are currently in the process of 
updating the California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CalARP) and PSM regulations 
[References 4 and 5], in which the term Damage Mechanism Review (DMR) is defined under the 
Mechanical Integrity section of the regulations.  
 
The list of DMR requirements in the proposed regulations effectively covers all the issues that 
one could raise related to the impact of damage mechanisms on process piping and equipment.  
Clearly they must be addressed systematically and thoroughly to ensure that all potential damage 
scenarios are identified and addressed.  Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), as it is practiced today, 
provides one such methodology.  In this article, the various damage mechanisms that may 
threaten integrity of piping and equipment are discussed first.  A PHA-based methodology that 
has been successfully applied is presented along with example cases.   
 
2. Typical Damage Mechanisms in the Process Industry 
Typical damage mechanisms in refining and hydrocarbon processing can be found in API 571 
[Reference 6].  There are more than 70 damage mechanisms listed in this publication, which 
serves as a good starting point to gain an understanding of the damage mechanisms that may 
occur in the petroleum industry.  It must be noted that API 571 is not comprehensive of all 
damage mechanisms. The damage mechanisms identified in API 571 are not unique to refining 
or hydrocarbon processing and all of them can be found in other process industries.  API 571 
provides a definition for each damage mechanism, provides visual depictions of each 
mechanism, discusses the materials affected, and explains the Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) 
techniques that may be used to discover the presence of a damage mechanism.  There are many 
other publications and reference books that define corrosion mechanisms specific to process 
industries.   
 
3. Applying PHA Methodology to Address Damage Mechanisms 
In the RMP and PSM regulations, it is stated that Process Hazard Analysis shall address “The 
hazards of the process” [e.g., see 40 CFR 68.67 of Reference 7].  Identifying and addressing the 
hazards of the process is an important step in risk reduction application within the chemical 
processing industry.  This effort not only ensures that a site complies with the regulatory 
requirements, but provides owners with a method of reducing the potential for high severity 
consequences.  Therefore, since most chemical process systems are susceptible to various forms 
of damage mechanisms, the PHA process can play an essential role in establishing these hazards 
and their associated risks.  
 
A Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a risk assessment used for identifying potential hazards 
associated with chemical processing systems and associated operations.  Several methodologies 
exists for conducting a PHA.  The specific methodology that we have used to identify and 
address damage mechanism hazards is the Guide-Word Style Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) 
study approach.   
 
3.1 Key Attributes of Guide-Word Style HAZOP 
A HAZOP study is a systematic and methodical review of system design and operation.  The 
study uses an investigative technique known as the "guide-word method" [Reference 8].  This 
method employs a pre-selected set of parameters and guidewords to facilitate a thought process 
for identifying potentially hazardous situations or operating problems.  Guide-word methodology 
is widely accepted by the process industry and governmental agencies as the most convenient 
systematic method for identifying hazardous conditions in process systems. 
 
It is important to note that a HAZOP is conducted by a team of experts in a set of brainstorming 
sessions which are led by a facilitator.  Typically, the discussions are recorded by a scribe using 
a standardized spreadsheet.  The team of experts typically represents engineering, operations, 
maintenance, safety and health, and management.  Other experts are often invited on an as 
needed basis when addressing specialized topics such as electrical power distribution, rotating 
equipment, and other special issues. 
 
The HAZOP methodology is based on the premise that each component or segment of a system 
has a specific design intent, and a deviation from this intent may lead to a hazardous condition.  
For example, a distillation tower is designed to contain a certain amount of fluid.  Maintaining 
the liquid level within safe limits is a design intent of operating the tower.  If the tower is 
overfilled (a deviation from the design intent) liquid may enter the vapor lines and may lead to 
adverse consequences downstream.  If the vessel level drops below a certain level (also a 
deviation), pump cavitation and operational problems may be experienced.  Corrosion and other 
damage mechanisms can be regarded as a deviation that may have long or short term effects.  
 
In a HAZOP study, the system is divided into nodes (segments, or process sections).  The nodes 
may be selected based on the conditions of the effluents in the system.  Typically, nodes are 
selected based on changes in the physical conditions of the effluent, that is, changes in pressure, 
temperature, composition, etc.  Vessels, heat exchangers and pumping devices are typical points 
around which a node may be selected.  For each node, the design intent and high and low 
operating limits and design parameters are specified.  
 
In a HAZOP study, the applicable parameters and possibility of deviations are investigated for 
each node.  If a cause can be identified for a deviation, the consequences of occurrence of that 
cause are established.  With the damage mechanism hazard review, this practice is slightly 
modified.  Damage mechanisms and their associated hazards can be identified in the node where 
the susceptible equipment is addressed.  That way, when the team is reviewing a node for 
damage mechanisms, they are focused on the conditions and operating parameters specific to that 
node.  
 
3.2 Augmenting the HAZOP Approach 
The important aspect of the HAZOP approach that allows for an effective and thorough damage 
mechanism hazard review is that in a HAZOP, complex systems are broken down into more 
manageable “nodes”.  As discussed in Section 3.1, each Node is provided with a standard set of 
deviations to be reviewed.  In our studies, we address damage mechanisms by adding a 
“Corrosion” or “Damage Mechanism” deviation to the list of parameters and deviations for each 
node.  Other deviations such as “Erosion” and “As Well As Composition” can also be used as a 
brainstorming tool to identify damage mechanisms.  
 
To address damage mechanisms, personnel with expertise in equipment and pipe metallurgy, 
inspection, and damage and failure mechanisms are required to participate during these reviews.  
The typical PHA Team (facilitator, engineering, and operations) will progress through the 
analysis following the typical HAZOP process.  Following the completion of a set of nodes 
reviewed by the PHA Team, an expanded team that includes personnel with expertise in 
equipment and pipe inspection, and damage and failure mechanisms will be required to review 
the damage mechanism portion of the analysis.  The set of new personnel may include area 
inspectors, and plant materials and corrosion experts.   
 
If not already provided as part of the Process Hazard Analysis, the team should request damage 
mechanism related Process Safety Information (PSI) such as Corrosion Control Plans, inspection 
history and results, and process metallurgy and corrosion diagrams.  These documents provide a 
starting point for identifying damage mechanisms as part of this robust HAZOP approach.  
 
At this stage of the process, the combined team will review each previously addressed node and 
focus specifically on the defined Corrosion/Damage Mechanism deviation.  There are several 
benefits of applying this approach.  First, during the damage mechanism hazard review the 
integrated team examines the damage mechanisms by focusing their attention on specific 
sections of the system.  This allows the team to manageably brainstorm damage mechanisms that 
may occur in the section of the system without broadly analyzing large systems, which in turn 
requires larger amounts of information for the team to digest.  Secondly, because the HAZOP 
approach relies on identifying deviations from normal operation, it becomes an ideal method for 
identifying damage mechanisms that may occur or be exacerbated by exceeding normal 
operating parameters such as temperature, pressure, and composition.  Lastly, the primary 
purpose of a PHA is to identify credible events that may lead to adverse consequences and 
determine whether appropriate mitigations are in place.  As such, including a thorough review of 
damage mechanisms hazards in a PHA ensures that those related risks are adequately identified 
and addressed.  
 
3.3 Defining Scenarios - What to Look for? 
Identifying damage mechanism related scenarios can be somewhat of a difficult task for a 
HAZOP Team that has spent a large portion of their discussion reviewing errors or failures that 
resulted in an immediate or short term noticeable impacts (e.g., inadvertent manipulation of a 
block valve or a specific pump failing).  With damage mechanisms, these types of errors or 
failures may not be the only initiating events for these damaging conditions.   
 
For an effective review the team must work together to clearly define the operating scenarios, 
which will be used to assist the materials and corrosion expert in establishing the corrosion 
mechanisms that may occur.  The expert must have a clear understanding of how the process unit 
is being operated.  The operations staff and process engineers are the critical personnel that must 
relay this information. 
The materials and corrosion expert identifies corrosion and damage mechanisms based on a set 
of categories that can easily be reviewed.  The nodes are reviewed to determine if there are hot 
corrosion mechanisms or cooler ones that may be aqueous.  The materials and corrosion expert is 
also seeking points where chemicals are injected or there are process mixing streams.  These 
points may create additional corrosion concerns due to possible increase in corrosivity within the 
system, or a thermal differential that may cause thermal fatigue. 
Hot Corrosion Mechanisms 
If the system is operating hot, the materials and corrosion expert will be looking for a specific set 
of corrosion or material degradation mechanisms.  Hot corrosion mechanisms generally do not 
result in the pitting type corrosion more commonly found with aqueous corrosion mechanisms.  
Hot corrosion mechanisms in general cause degradation if the materials of construction are 
chosen improperly or are operated at excessive temperatures.  The corrosion mechanisms at high 
temperatures typically result in a general wall loss and often result in scaling as in the case of 
high temperature oxidation.  These mechanisms are often of greater concern than the lower 
temperature aqueous corrosion situations where there is pitting that results in a small leak at the 
initial failure point. 
In addition to high temperature corrosion mechanisms, there are a large number of materials 
degradation mechanisms.  The material degradation mechanisms may not be as easy to inspect 
for, and may require destructive testing to prove their existence.  Typically, there is a time 
component involved in material degradation.  During these events, it is critical that the team 
establishes the duration of a temperature excursion or abnormal operation. 
Some of these material issues do not affect the material while in operation, but change the 
materials strength and ductility when it is cooled back to near ambient temperature.  Based on 
the findings of the HAZOP, the materials and corrosion expert may recommend adjusting the 
shutdown and startup of the unit to compensate for loss of the material’s physical properties.    
A few examples of these high temperature degradation mechanisms are sulfidation in an 
environment containing sulfur, high temperature hydrogen attack in a system with hydrogen, and 
high temperature oxidation in a system which contains oxygen or is open to the atmosphere, 
sensitization of an austenitic steel, temper embrittlement of low chrome steel, sigma phase 
embrittlement, and graphitization of carbon steel.  The list of mechanisms is quite long and it is 
important that the materials and corrosion expert understands which mechanisms affect the 
materials of construction of the equipment in each HAZOP Node.  It should be noted that 
materials may degrade while operating within the design maximum allowable working pressure 
(MAWP) and the maximum allowable working temperature (MAWT). 
Lower Temperature Aqueous Corrosion 
Lower temperature aqueous corrosion generally requires free water to be present in the system.  
The most common cause of these aqueous corrosion mechanisms are oxygen, acids and salts in 
the free water.  While looking at aqueous corrosion mechanisms the corrosion expert must 
understand chemistry and how these corrodents will affect the materials of construction.  While 
many of these mechanisms result in pits that create small leaks for an initial failure, several of 
them may result in environmental cracking.  Environmental cracking can be a short-term or long-
term failure mode depending on the mechanism and the environment.  The corrosion expert must 
understand how severe the environment would be and at what rate the environmental cracking 
would propagate in the material used in the node.  As an example, hot caustic has been known to 
propagate through an inch of carbon steel within twelve hours and chloride stress corrosion 
cracking, from rain water at ring joints, has been found where it has not propagated through wall 
after decades of operation. 
While looking for aqueous corrosion mechanisms, it is imperative that the materials and 
corrosion expert reviews any dead legs including small vents and drains in the system that could 
collect water and potentially result in concentration of corrodents.  It is not uncommon for the 
dead leg to have significantly worse corrosion than the main piping.  In some cases, the piping 
that is considered a dead leg may actually have a small flow rate due to thermal siphoning.  If 
there is a concern for thermal siphoning, the materials and corrosion expert must review the 
piping layout to understand if the piping configuration would allow flow and if there is a large 
enough temperature difference to drive the thermal siphon.  Thermal siphons create flow from a 
hot piping system to a cold one.  At the cold end of the system there is an increased risk of salt 
deposits or water collection.  In rare cases in hot systems, the low flow rate in a siphon allows 
time for thermal cracking and creates a significantly greater corrosion rate in the siphon.  
Injection and Mixing Points 
Injection and mixing points have two general concerns.  The first concern is a thermal 
differential that could result in thermal fatigue of the piping at, upstream or downstream of the 
mix point. There are several criteria for looking at these mix points for thermal fatigue related to 
whether the flow is liquid, gas or vapor.  Temperature differences of the two mixing streams that 
are greater than 200°F for austenitic stainless steels or 300°F for carbon and low alloy steels are 
of concern and may need additional review.  The second concern is that the difference in 
temperature or stream contents could result in precipitation of more corrosive chemicals, salts or 
solids that could exacerbate corrosion.  In some cases, the mixing of the two streams creates a 
temperature increase by the heat of mixing which may increase the corrosivity of the fluids or 
create enough temperature difference for thermal fatigue to occur.  Similarly, the mixing of two 
streams may result in an endothermic reaction that could cool the piping to a temperature where 
it no longer has good mechanical properties or creates thermal fatigue concerns. 
Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI) 
The final item in all corrosion reviews is to identify the systems that have insulation.  If the 
system is operating at a temperature below 400°F, corrosion under insulation (CUI) is a concern 
that must be addressed.  The current Nondestructive Examination (NDE) techniques are not 
particularly good at finding CUI.  It is critical that the design and construction is proper and 
includes a coating under the insulation as well as good moisture barrier outside of the insulation.  
CUI is the largest cause of leaks in chemical and hydrocarbon processing plants.  It is one of the 
more difficult corrosion mechanisms to find.  CUI generally results in pitting and small initial 
leaks but can cause quite large leaks without early detection.  
Microbiologically Induced Corrosion (MIC) 
Microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) is the most difficult corrosion mechanism to identify 
during a HAZOP and is also one of the most difficult mechanisms to discover with inspection.  
MIC can occur in many systems and can create rapid failures.  Because MIC can attack most 
materials, it is critical that the materials and corrosion expert explains to the team what 
conditions are required for the attack in the materials of construction.  It is up to the team to help 
find any locations in the Nodes where these conditions occur. 
3.4 Identifying the Initiating Cause of the Damage Mechanism 
The PHA Team along with the materials and corrosion expert should review corrosion control 
plans, corrosion diagrams, and other damage mechanism related PSI as the initial step to identify 
damage mechanisms.  These documents will provide the known damage mechanisms of concern.  
Identifying existing unknown damage mechanisms will be an imperative task for the team.  
To identify other damage mechanisms that may arise, the materials and corrosion expert must 
have good process information through operations and process engineering support.  The 
materials and corrosion expert will use the information gained through team discussion to 
determine the damage mechanism initiating causes.  The process information is required in order 
to implement a thorough review and must include process temperatures, pressures, flow rates, 
and chemical constituents.   
In addition to the information regarding normal operations, the process engineer and operations 
representative must relay information related to abnormal operations and conditions to the team.  
Abnormal operations that must be considered include startup, shutdown, any anticipated 
regenerations, regular equipment bypassing or upset conditions.  While these abnormal 
operations do not typically occur over an extended period of time, the effects may be cumulative 
with some damage mechanisms.  An example of a cumulative damage mechanism would be high 
temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA).   
Often, the worst corrosion in a system takes place during the startup and shutdown.  While 
reviewing the nodes, the corrosion expert should explain to the operations and process 
engineering support what damage could be occurring during these abnormal operations.  With 
this information in mind, operations and process engineering support may be able to change their 
operation during these abnormal situations to mitigate damage mechanisms. 
Care must be taken when identifying the initiating cause of a damage mechanism.  When 
identifying these initiating events, a common method is for the PHA facilitator and team to state 
the damage mechanism as the cause.  For example, teams may state “microbiologically induced 
corrosion” as the cause.  With our reviews, we typically try describe the cause statement in terms 
of the initiating event(s) or design condition(s) that provide the environment conducive for the 
damage mechanism to occur.  In the case of microbiologically induced corrosion, the initiating 
events can be issues such as “debris in the cooling water supply laying down in heat exchange 
tubes” or “loss of biocide injection”.  With this approach, the likelihood of the event and the 
available safeguards can be more clearly established and the team can explore the possibility of 
implementing inherently safer design.   
 
When identifying initiating causes of damage mechanisms, we have two specific approaches that 
are followed:  
1. Identify deviations from the normal operating conditions (conditions commonly 
addressed in the HAZOP) and establish damage mechanisms that may occur during 
these conditions and  
2. Identify damage mechanisms that occur due to normal operating conditions or based 
on system design (e.g., metallurgy, control valves with high pressure drops).   
 
The first approach is to conduct the HAZOP study, paying particular attention to causes that can 
lead to process upsets or abnormal conditions.  Specifically, exceeding design temperatures and 
pressures and abnormal composition are conditions that should be noted for further review with 
the materials and/or corrosion expert during the damage mechanism hazard review segments of 
the analysis.   
 
One such mechanism that provides an example of the first approach is high temperature 
sulfidation, which to some extent is the corrosion mechanism that initiated California’s drive 
towards the requirement for Damage Mechanism Reviews.  Per API 571 [Reference 6], the three 
critical factors in the occurrence of high temperature sulfidation are alloy composition, metal 
temperatures above 500°F, and concentration of corrosive sulfur compounds.  Of those factors, 
the HAZOP process can easily identify specific initiating events that may lead to high 
temperature conditions.  Issues such as loss of reflux to a fractionation tower, increased reboiler 
firing, or increased feed preheat will be upset conditions addressed during the HAZOP.  
Additionally, piping material information should readily be available (e.g., information provided 
on P&IDs and PFDs) as part of the PSI required for PHA.  The PHA team, with the expertise of 
the materials and corrosion expert, should review scenarios such as these and determine if these 
upset conditions can result in both near and long term corrosion damage.  As part of this review, 
the inspector needs to make sure that the corrosion measurement locations (CML’s) are in the 
proper location and number to measure the damage. 
 
The second approach is to explore the possibility of damage mechanisms occurring while the 
system is operating within its acceptable parameters.  In these instances, the team must review 
the physical design of the system, paying particular attention to metallurgy, appurtenances 
connected to the system, and external conditions to the system.  In this approach, the analysis 
requires the materials and corrosion expert to review the identified node and work closely with 
the team to discuss any damage mechanisms that may occur.  At this time, the operations and 
engineering representatives will verify whether the condition of the system provides the 
conducive environment for the identified damage mechanism.  
 
The team should pose questions such as: 
- What type of damage mechanisms can occur in this type of environment? 
- Is the metallurgy appropriate for this service? 
- Has the team experienced or noticed any system conditions of concern?  
- Are there deadlegs, CUI, mixpoints, or high pressure drop areas within this node? 
- How often do they have to manually drain systems that should be dry? 
- Are there damage mechanisms that arise only under specific conditions such as high/low 
temperature, high/low pressure, or under specific compositional conditions?  If so, can 
this system provide those conditions during normal and abnormal operations?  
 
A damage mechanism that provides an example of the second approach is Corrosion Under 
Insulation (CUI).  This damage mechanism does not result directly from an abnormal process 
condition, but is rather influenced by external conditions to the system.  The initiating cause can 
be stated in terms of “damaged insulation due to external causes” or “excessive rainfall” as 
examples.  Figure 1 provides sample initiating events written on a typical HAZOP worksheet.  
 
Figure 1 - Sample Cause Statements 
 
 
3.5 Establishing Consequence and Risk Ranking 
Consequences are the result of the deviation cause and may be expressed in terms of system 
condition, release of materials, effects on other equipment, deterioration of equipment, adverse 
effects on workers and the public, etc.  When expressing the consequences of a deviation, no 
limits are imposed in terms of location and area.  Consequence discussions are carried out until 
all possible adverse conditions are identified.  Also, when discussing potential consequences, no 
credit is given to the mitigative impact of the available safeguards.  This practice allows the 
analysts to identify the worst possible consequence level that is needed to create a common basis 
for establishing the risk ranking of each scenario.   
 
Postulating and documenting the consequence of a damage mechanism follows the same 
approach used during the HAZOP with one special consideration: the end result of a damage 
mechanism may require a longer amount of time to become evident than other process upset 
conditions.  For example, a damage mechanism may require months or years under a specific 
condition to result in a through-wall failure.  Resultantly, the facilitator must be cautious in 
establishing the final consequence and must drive the discussion to determine whether there is a 
reasonable potential for the damage mechanism to reach the worst-case consequence (i.e., loss of 
containment event or significant asset damage).  The facilitator should ensure that both the 
damage mechanisms with short term, as well as long term damage are discussed as part of these 
analyses.  Figure 2 provides a flow chart that can be used to establish whether a damage 
mechanism consequence should be postulated as a loss of containment event. 
 
In terms of the HAZOP style for stating the consequence, the team must identify any initiating 
factors resulting from the cause that leads to the damage mechanism, then identify the damage 
mechanism, and finally identify the worst credible result of the damage mechanism in terms of 
the failure size and release potential.  In these instances, we suggest being thorough in the 
documentation and provide all enabling conditions of the event as part of the consequence 
statement and/or as a remark for the scenario.   
 
The team, with the guidance of the materials and corrosion expert, should identify the failure in 
terms of expected failure size (e.g., pinhole leak, fish mouth failure, brittle fracture, crack, etc.).  
As stated above, specific care must be taken to establish a realistic consequence since many 
damage mechanisms do not immediately result in loss of containment events.  Several factors 
that play into this determination are the following: 
 
• Type of and aggressiveness of the damage mechanism 
• Frequency of the initiating cause and acceptable allowance for recurrence of the cause 
• Existing wall thickness of affected equipment (will the thinning wall last until the next 
scheduled inspection?) 
• Existing and type of maintenance inspections (will the type of inspection method identify 
the thinning condition and measure it while online?) 
 
In addition, consideration should also be given to the pressure, temperature, and composition of 
the released material.  All of these factors will affect the ultimate consequence severity of the 
event.  For example, a pinhole leak in a system that is at 5 psig will have a different effect that a 
pinhole leak in a system at 500 psig.  In addition, a pinhole leak of sour water will have a 
different consequence than a release of sour hydrocarbon gas.  It must be noted that damage 
mechanisms that crack or can create catastrophic failures are generally not accepted by the 
materials and  
 
Figure 2 - Damage Mechanism Consequence Flow Chart
corrosion expert during the design.  If credible damage mechanisms that create cracking or 
catastrophic failures are found during the HAZOP, a recommendation should be made to 
mitigate the initiating cause or to change the material of construction. 
 
It is the PHA Team’s responsibility to identify the appropriate consequence of the damage 
mechanism under review.  An accurate consequence will assist in determining whether 
additional protective measures are required.  Figure 3 provides an example of the consequence 
structure.  
 
Figure 3 - Sample Consequence Statements 
 
3.6 Defining safeguards 
Damage mechanism scenarios will have a variety of safeguards that will be unique to the specific 
damage mechanism and will deviate from the normal HAZOP approach of identifying 
safeguards.  The identified safeguards will be in terms of process upset detection (alarms), 
inspection and testing types and frequencies, and personnel observation (i.e., during operator 
rounds).  
 
As discussed earlier, damage mechanisms can occur either due to a process upset condition (e.g., 
high/low temperature or pressure) or can be expected to occur due to current process design and 
equipment conditions.  For the former cases, the PHA team should identify any alarms that may 
alert personnel to conditions susceptible to a specific damage mechanism.  For example, high 
temperature alarms and their appropriate set points may be noted as detective safeguards against 
High Temperature Hydrogen Attack or material creep.     
 
For damage mechanisms of the latter form, the PHA Team must determine the type and 
frequency of the inspection protocol and should only identify these actions as safeguards if they 
are part of current facility practices.  The adequacy of inspection and testing practices must take 
into consideration previous inspection/testing results, current expected equipment wall thickness 
and calculated corrosion rate.  The review of the inspection adequacy may require outside 
expertise when inspecting for specific damage mechanisms that require specialized inspection 
techniques.  Otherwise, a recommendation should be generated (see Section 3.3.4 below).   
 
The PHA Team should discuss the following questions: 
- What type of inspection techniques are used?  
- Do these inspection techniques follow industry guidelines for equipment in this type of 
service? 
- Is there sufficient wall thickness to last until the next scheduled inspection? 
- Are there any upset conditions that may worsen the effect of this damage mechanism? If 
so, are there detective devices and written responses to these upsets?  
 
Figure 4 provides an example of safeguards identified during a HAZOP. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Sample Safeguards 
 
  
3.7 Considering Recommendations 
As it is typically practiced in a HAZOP study, a recommendation must be generated if the 
scenario risk ranking demonstrates an unacceptable risk per the facility’s risk ranking matrix.  
Recommendations may also be generated if there is team consensus that modifications to the 
system’s mechanical integrity program or additional system modifications are warranted.  The 
facilitator should also discuss the possibility of equipment replacement with improved 
metallurgy or internal cladding as potential recommendations (inherently safer design).  
Additionally, recommendations must be made if there are any conditions (e.g., maintenance 
practice or equipment metallurgy) that do not meet current site or industry standards 
(RAGAGEP).   
 
4. Team Composition and Associated Roles and Responsibilities 
4.1 PHA Facilitator’s Role 
The facilitator’s role is to guide the discussion using a standard and consistent methodology and 
ensure that there is detailed documentation of the discussion.  In these analyses, the facilitator 
should also ensure that the team is following a consistent approach when discussing the damage 
mechanism and identifying the worst-case consequence.  It is the facilitator’s role to challenge 
the team to identify the worst credible case scenario to ensure that a thorough and accurate 
analysis is performed.  Ideally, the facilitator should record as much information as possible on 
the HAZOP worksheets such that the basis for the consequence, risk ranking, and safeguards are 
provided.  This may include information such as expected rate of corrosion and conditions that 
may increase the corrosion rate or effects of the damage mechanism.  
 
4.2 PHA Team’s Role 
The PHA Team provides the documents and knowledge that define the engineering and 
operational aspects of the process.  The PHA Team’s role is to assist in establishing the initiating 
cause and the ultimate consequence of the postulated scenario.  It is the responsibility of the 
PHA team (operations and engineering) to identify the process upset condition that can lead to 
higher corrosion potential in the system.  In addition, the PHA team must establish the worst-
case consequence and determine the appropriate risk ranking for the scenario.   
 
Additionally, the PHA Team should note any unique or abnormal corrosion issues that have been 
observed.  PHAs allow for members of engineering and operations to voice any observed 
concerns and receive an appropriate response for those identified issues.  This may include any 
observed external corrosion on equipment, potential process deadlegs and mixpoints (injection 
points), cavitation heard in the system, abnormal levels of fouling in the system and upset 
conditions that may result in damage mechanisms identified by the corrosion expert. 
 
4.3 Materials and Corrosion Expert’s Role 
When reviewing damage mechanisms as part of PHAs, the materials and corrosion expert plays 
the crucial role of identifying the damage mechanisms that may affect the system.  The materials 
and corrosion expert provides the materials, corrosion and inspection experience.  The materials 
and corrosion expert must understand all of the corrosion mechanisms that would be present 
within the reviewed process.  They must also be an expert in the materials of construction that 
would normally be used for the process unit.  In addition, the materials and corrosion expert must 
have an understanding of Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) methods that would be used for 
detection of corrosion mechanisms in the materials of construction for the unit.  Lastly, the 
corrosion expert will assist the team in consequence determination, identification of appropriate 
safeguards, and risk ranking scenarios.  
 
Figure 5 - Team Responsibilities in the Context of  

















5. Sample HAZOP Corrosion Scenarios 
Damage mechanism hazards can easily be addressed using a standard HAZOP worksheet.  The 
HAZOP worksheet provides an easy means to fluidly review both process upset conditions and 
damage mechanisms.  Figure 6 provides a sample PHA worksheet taken from a recent study.
 
Materials and Corrosion 
Expert 
1. Identify known damage 
mechanisms of concern. 
2. Establish the type of failure 
that may occur. 
3. Provide an estimated time 
frame until loss of 
containment 
4. Identify appropriate 
safeguards 
5. Respond to concerns by the 
team. 
6. Propose recommendations 
when deemed necessary 
PHA Team 
Engineering and 
O i  
1. Provide operating 
conditions 
2. Identify process upset 
conditions 
3. Establish the consequence 
severity based on the type 
of failure, released material 
and process conditions 
4. Establish the likelihood 
based on the estimated time 
until failure 





1. Lead the HAZOP 
discussion 
2. Ensure the Corrosion 
Expert receives and 
provides needed 
information 
3. Ensure the HAZOP method 
is applied properly and 
documented consistently.  










6. Proposed California PSM and CalARP Requirements 
The Damage Mechanism Review clause of the proposed CalARP and California PSM 
regulations [References 4 and 5] include many similarities to the requirements established in the 
Process Hazard Analysis section of those regulations.  Similarities include the requirement that 
the analysis be revalidated on a 5-year cycle, the analysis must be performed by a team with the 
necessary expertise, reports must be retained for the life of the system, and the analysis must 
include methods to prevent or mitigate damage (safeguards).  With these similarities, the PHA 
naturally can become an initial starting point to ensure a thorough review of damage mechanisms 
hazards.  The discussed approach provides a systematic and thorough method for addressing 
damage mechanism related hazards.  At this moment, the requirement for Damage Mechanism 
Reviews will only apply to California refineries, but many other types of chemical process 
facilities are susceptible to damage mechanisms.  Therefore, part of a facility’s risk reduction 





In the chemical process industry, the occurrence of damage mechanisms on process equipment is 
unavoidable, but can be mitigated through improved metallurgy, positive identification 
(inspection and testing), and proper control of operating conditions.  Hazard reviews are 
completed for known mechanisms under known operating conditions.  While we readily review 
what is known, it is the unknown that has caused many of industries worst failures.   
 
The first step to mitigating the effects of damage mechanisms is proper identification of these 
mechanisms and establishing the risk levels of such conditions.  As such, the Process Hazard 
Analysis (specifically Guide-Word Style HAZOP approach) required as part of the Risk 
Management Plan and Process Safety Management regulations provides an effective means to 
identify damage mechanisms, establishes their effect (consequences), verifies appropriateness 
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